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Embodied in the documentation by which Britain accepted the 
League of Nations mandate for Palestine in 1922 were clauses 
facilitating Jewish immigration to the country. The Palestinians 
were hostile to Jewish immigration and settlement, resulting in 
recurring bouts of violence in the 1920s and early 1930s as the 
Arabs attacked Jewish settlers and the British authorities. Jewish 
immigration peaked in 1936, the year in which the Palestinians 
began a full-scale, nation-wide revolt. The spark for the uprising 
was an attack on 15 April 1936 on a convoy of taxis on the 
Nablus to Tulkarm road in which the assailants murdered two 
Jewish passengers.
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 Portrayed in the press as an act of Arab 
banditry, the assault was possibly the result of specific targeting 
of Jews by Arab ‘Islamic patriots’, followers of the late Shaykh Izz 
al-Din al-Qassam, killed by British police in 1935.
2
 At the funeral 
for one of the dead Jews in Tel Aviv, there was rioting; at the 
same time, gunmen shot two Arab workers sleeping in a hut in a 
revenge attack. An Arab general strike and revolt ensued that 
lasted till October 1936 when British diplomatic efforts channelled 
through the rulers of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and Yemen 
led to a ceasefire during which a Commission headed by Lord Peel 
came to Palestine to determine the territory’s future. The Arabs’ 
rejection of Peel’s conclusion in 1937 that Palestine should be 
partitioned led to a second phase of the revolt from September 
1937 to late 1939: the violence finally petered out with the 
approaching war in Europe. For long stretches of the revolt, 
especially its second phase after 1937, the British lost control of 
swathes of Palestine, including most major towns and, for about 
five days in October 1938, the Old City of Jerusalem. The rebels 
attacked Jewish settlers in Palestine, but as the revolt was an 
attempt to divert British policy, they also targeted British soldiers, 
colonial officials, police officers and Palestinians working for the 
mandate government. To suppress the revolt, the British 
launched an intense and prolonged imperial policing operation in 
aid of the civil authority — or, as we would say today, a 
counter-insurgency campaign, a term that became fashionable 
after 1945— which involved at its height in 1938 an immense 
force built around two army divisions numbering some 25,000 
servicemen.  
How humane were the British authorities in their response to 
the revolt? Did the British operate within the rule of law, and did 
servicemen avoid what today would be called human rights 
abuses? Were the British comparatively enlightened in 
suppressing the revolt compared to, say, other European powers 
operating in similar conditions? These are topical questions, not 
least as the military history literature on counterinsurgency
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emphasises British success in this sphere, the ‘hearts and minds’ 
aspect to British counter-insurgency and British ‘ exceptionalism’ 
in which British armed forces — ‘generally more scrupulous than 
most’
4 
— worked within the rule of law, avoiding the abuses 
against non-combatants that supposedly characterised other 
colonial and post-colonial powers. ‘No country which relies on the 
law of the land to regulate the lives of its citizens can afford to 
see that law flouted by its own government, even in an 
insurgency situation. In other words everything done by a 
government and its agents in combating insurgency must be 
legal’, was the conclusion of a leading British soldier that 
expressed the ideal of the British ‘way’ in counter-insurgency, 
and an issue discussed in Sir Robert Thompson’s influential 
Defeating Communist Insurgency (1965).
5
 More recently, 
Caroline Elkins in her examination of Britain’s suppression of the 
‘Mau Mau’ revolt in Kenya in the 1950s wrote:
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Decades had been spent constructing Britain’s imperial image, 
and that image contrasted sharply with the brutal behavior of 
other European empires in Africa. King Leopold’s bloody rule in 
the Congo, the German directed genocide of the Herero in 
South-West Africa, and France’s disgrace in Algeria — the 
British reputedly avoided all of these excesses because, simply, 
it was British to do so.  
 
This was also the view of senior British military commanders in 
Palestine at the time, one of whom remarked to a colleague, ‘If 
the Germans were in occupation in Haifa we’d not have any 
bloody trouble from the Arabs’.
7  
The literature — in Arabic,
8 
English
9
 and Hebrew
10
 — on the 
revolt is exiguous and skates over the issue of the conduct of 
soldiers in the field, excepting some of the Arabic-language 
volumes, which record contemporaneous accounts of British 
brutality. While the Arabic material is the most extensive, it is 
dated, rarely uses British sources and is often printed primary 
material. The Hebrew literature focuses either on the internal 
dynamics within the Palestinian community or on Zionist military 
training in this period, as opposed to any abuses committed by 
British troops, Yuval Arnon-Ohanna and Hillel Cohen’s books 
being good examples of examinations of intra-Arab relations.
11 
Simeon Shoul’s recent English-language doctoral thesis on British 
imperial policing recognised this gap, arguing that ‘there has 
been to date a general reliance …. that the British employed 
minimal force. Where this is gainsaid, and brutality alleged, there 
are only partial attempts to quantify the force employed …. There 
has been a persistent failure to dig into the experience of many 
people “on the ground,” an accompanying over-reliance on official 
sources’.
12
 Shoul is right; the methodological challenge when 
examining the conduct of British armed forces in Palestine is 
finding the evidence of abuse by soldiers and officials who were 
reluctant to leave a record of abuses against non-combatants. For 
both perpetrator and victim, so often, ‘You don’t want to 
remember the bad stuff’, which is hidden away or forgotten.
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What was the legal system that bound and directed British 
servicemen in Palestine after 1936, underpinning and legitimising 
counter-rebel operations? Legally, British soldiers fighting internal 
insurgents conducted themselves as an aid to the civil power, an 
issue articulated at the time by Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn 
and Colonel H.J. Simson, building on the earlier work of Captain 
C.E. Callwell.
14 
The King’s Regulations and the 1929 Manual of 
Military Law bound soldiers of all rank, the latter a bulky 
hard-back volume updating the Army Discipline and Regulation 
Act (1879) and Army Act (1881), the key points of which 
appeared in abridged form in pocket-sized paper-back pamphlets 
such as Notes on Imperial Policing, 1934 and the 1937 Duties in 
the Aid of the Civil Power that officers could take with them on 
operations.
15 
The 1929 manual was precise on how soldiers 
should conduct themselves, forbidding, for instance, stealing from 
and maltreatment of civilians. The 1929 regulations stated that a 
soldier was also a citizen and subject to civil as well as military 
law, and that an ‘act which constitutes an offence if committed by 
a civilian is none the less an offence if committed by a soldier’, 
but it also provided a legal framework for shooting rioters and 
allowed for ‘collective punishments’ and  ‘retribution’, both 
loosely defined terms in the 1929 volume and both of which are 
relevant to what happened in Palestine.
16
 Neither the 1929 
volume nor the subsequent 1934 and 1937 pamphlets provided 
any concrete definition for what constituted collective punishment 
and reprisals, thereby giving field commanders considerable 
leeway when it came to interpreting the rules. The law for 
soldiers was clear: they should use collective punishment and 
retribution as a last resort and, if possible, that they should avoid 
needless civilian suffering and any offence towards religion, race 
or class, but the 1929 law clearly stated that where coercion was 
required or where terrorism needed to be checked, collective 
punishment and reprisals, which will ‘inflict suffering upon 
innocent individuals’, were ‘indispensable as a last resource’.
17 
As 
the law stated, ‘The existence of an armed insurrection would 
justify the use of any degree of force necessary effectually to 
meet and cope with the insurrection’.
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In Palestine, in 1924–25, the British had formalised the 
principle of collective punishment in the Collective Responsibility 
and Punishment Ordinances, building on the idea that Palestinian 
village life was a collective ‘social system based on mutual 
protection rather than justice’, a view in some measure endorsed 
by arrangements such as the collective rural faz‘a (alarm) 
security system whereby certain villages would help one another 
in times of crisis.
19
 The British updated these ordinances in 1936 
with the Collective Fines Ordinance, these local regulations being 
compatible with the personal instructions for soldiers detailed 
above.  
While civil proceedings against servicemen for individual 
offences during any military operations were theoretically 
possible, a strict reading of the military law in force with its broad 
acceptance of group punishment and reprisal action meant that 
tough action was within the law. Where theft, brutality and 
assault occurred, unlawful under the ‘civil’ element of the law 
governing conduct, soldiers had little to fear from disciplinary 
action as ‘Complaints about military were frequent, lawsuits 
rarer, and successful lawsuits almost unheard of … in the colonies 
the military had a freer hand than in Britain, and restraint of 
excessive violence was far lighter’.
20
 Victims could take out civil 
proceedings but before 1947 and the Crown Proceedings Act the 
Crown was immune from prosecution, so these would have to be 
against individual soldiers, and the victim would have to prove 
that the soldiers involved were acting beyond their lawful 
operational orders. This was not practicable, especially when 
soldiers had no identifying personal number or sign. One Arab 
claimed that soldier ‘number 65’ had beaten him, unaware that 
all the men from that unit, the York and Lancaster Regiment, 
formerly the 65th Foot, carried this number on the left side of 
their helmets.
21
 Moreover, the establishment of military courts 
and regulations in Palestine after September 1936 which could 
‘not be challenged by the ordinary civil courts’ made any such 
appeal almost impossible to succeed.
22
 This author has found only 
one successful prosecution of servicemen in Palestine, that of four 
British police officers who blatantly executed an Arab prisoner in 
the street in October 1938, witnessed by a number of non-British 
European residents, not Arabs, whose complaints never led to a 
prosecution.
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International conventions laying out rules of war, notably those 
at Geneva (1864, 1906 and 1929; superseded by the Geneva 
conventions of 1949) and the Hague (1899 and 1907; also the 
Draft Rules on Air War of 1923) also constrained British forces in 
Palestine. While the fourth convention of the 1949 Geneva 
conventions dealt specifically with the protection of civilians, the 
international laws in place in 1936 dealt with the conduct of war 
and the treatment of prisoners-of-war (POWs) rather than the 
maltreatment of civilians. Britain classified the Arab revolt as an 
internal insurrection and not an international war and so denied 
POW status to Arab fighters. Thus it treated captured Arab 
guerrillas as civilian criminals subject to the ordinary civil law 
modified by any conditions of martial law, such as the death 
penalty for carrying ammunition or a firearm, and for whom 
international law did not apply. Anyone found with arms or 
ammunition, except for government-issued licensed shotguns 
rationed out to compliant village mukhtars (headmen), was liable 
for the death penalty, an anomalous position in a country where 
rural villagers had rifles for hunting and personal protection. One 
old man with no criminal record received a sentence of ten years 
for having three rounds in a coffee pot — which the police could 
easily have planted during their search — a sentence reduced on 
appeal to four years.
24 
The British during the revolt were careful 
to put captured suspects before the courts, before hanging, 
sentencing or acquitting them. Later on in the revolt, quickly 
convened military courts passed rapid judgement — and justice 
soon followed, the convicted went very quickly to the gallows — 
but there was always the veneer of legal respectability.  
While British forces in Palestine during the revolt operated as 
an aid to the civil power, conditions in the country approached 
martial law, a situation that further eased civil limits on soldiers’ 
behaviour as under a martial law regime ‘acts might be carried 
out which would normally be illegal’.
25
 The British never instituted 
full (or ‘real’ ) martial law in Palestine, but in a series of Orders in 
Council and Emergency Regulations, 1936–37, they issued 
‘statutory’ martial law, a stage between semi-military rule under 
civil powers and full martial law under military powers, and one in 
which the army and not the civil High Commissioner had the 
upper hand.
26
 The British by the 1930s had ruled out full martial 
law in situations of ‘sub-wars’, excepting in the most extreme 
cases, the reference here usually being to the ‘Indian Mutiny’ of 
1857, but after the Arab capture of the Old City of Jerusalem in 
October 1938, the army effectively took over Jerusalem and then 
all of Palestine. In fact, since late 1937, the army had been in 
charge with the ‘full power of search and arrest, independent of 
the police, and the right to shoot and kill any man attempting to 
escape search or ignoring challenges. Grenades may be used 
during searches of caves, wells, etc. Since November [1937] 
co-operating aircraft have been “bombed-up,” and pilots 
instructed to machine gun or bomb “armed parties”.’
27
 There was 
de facto if not de jure martial law from late 1937 or early 1938. 
To be fair, the British never removed civil authority in Palestine 
from the decision-making process, but by 1938 the High 
Commissioner tempered rather than directed the actions of 
British armed forces and when Sir Arthur Wauchope, the High 
Commissioner in place for the first phase of the revolt, looked for 
a political solution to the revolt and challenged army efforts to 
institute martial law, he antagonised the armed forces who 
thought him too lenient and referred to him as ‘washout’ and 
‘ga-ga’.
28
 In March 1938, the Colonial Office replaced him with 
the more compliant Sir Harold MacMichael.  
In the examination that follows, can we distinguish between, 
say, ‘brutality’, ‘torture’ and ‘atrocity’, terms that are often used 
interchangeably? The language employed is significant. For 
instance, in 1991 one senior British officer objected to the BBC’s 
use of ‘brutality’ when describing British army actions in 
Palestine, suggesting ‘determination’ as a substitute, the BBC 
countering with an offer of ‘harshness’.
29
 The (British) dictionary 
definition of ‘atrocity’ raises the issue of ‘moral reference’: an act 
of ‘savage enormity, horrible or heinous wickedness, an atrocious 
deed, an act of extreme cruelty and heinousness with no moral 
reference’.
30
 For the Americans, such an act is ‘outrageously 
wicked, criminal, vile or cruel, heinous, horrible’.
31
 Such 
definitions could also apply to torture or extreme brutality.  
International conventions such as article five of the 1948 UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
32
 and article three of the 
1950 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
33
 do not define torture as 
much as outlaw the practice: ‘no one shall be subjected to torture 
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’,
34
 the same 
wording as was used in the 1987 European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.
35 
The 1984 United Nations (UN) Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment defined (part one, article one) torture (but not 
brutality) in the following terms, the last sentence being 
significant in relation to what happened in Palestine after 1936:
36  
 
… any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or 
a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating 
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising 
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.  
 
Similarly, the Council of Europe’s 1950 Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (article 
2) also raised the issue of the legal use of force: ‘Deprivation of 
life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this 
article [right to life] when it results from the use of force which is 
no more than absolutely necessary … in action lawfully taken for 
the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection’.
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The legal framework of reprisals and collective punishments 
directed British troops when they went on operations after April 
1936. Punishment in the form of the destruction of Arab property 
across urban and rural areas of Palestine was central to British 
military repression after 1936, the countryside being badly hit 
although there were some egregious house demolitions in urban 
areas. Destruction and vandalism became a systematic, systemic 
part of British counter-insurgency operations during the revolt, 
and justified by the legal measures in force at the time. Alongside 
the destruction, soldiers looted properties, something not 
officially sanctioned; indeed officers often tried to stop the men 
pilfering. Alongside the blowing up of houses — often the most 
impressive ones in the village — and the smashing up of Arab 
villagers’ homes, there were ‘reprisals’  in the form of heavy 
collective fines, forced labour and punitive village occupations by 
government forces for which villagers bore the cost. One Arab 
rebel noted that the British army was unable to ‘strike’ the 
fighters, so it had to resort to ‘revenge’ and ‘collective 
punishment’.
38
 Using air support, radio communications, 
intelligence, collaborators and mobile columns, the British 
improved their tactics against the rebel bands, but as they never 
were able to defeat an elusive enemy in open battle in rough 
terrain, they adopted a two-pronged military approach, targeting 
enemy fighters and the civilians on whom they relied for support. 
The level of damage varied depending on time, place and the 
regiment involved, but it could be very severe. In 1940, after the 
revolt was over, John Briance, a police officer who became the 
head of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Palestine, 
witnessed the ‘burn scars’ of the West Yorkshire Regiment at the 
village of Bayt Rima, north-west of Ramallah, ‘A disgrace to the 
British name’, an incident also referred to by a British doctor in 
Palestine at the time.
39 
Abuses went unreported as the British 
heavily censored the Palestinian Arabic-language newspapers, 
while commanders such as Major-General Bernard Montgomery in 
northern Palestine banished newspaper reporters so that his men 
could carry on their work untroubled by the media.
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During army searches, soldiers would surround a village — 
usually before dawn so that they could catch any suspects before 
they fled — the men and women then divided off, held apart from 
the houses, often in wired ‘cages’, while soldiers searched and 
often destroyed everything, burnt grain and poured olive oil over 
household food and effects.
41 
The men meanwhile were ‘screened’ 
by passing hooded or hidden Arab informers who would nod when 
a ‘suspect’ was found, or by British officials checking their papers 
against lists of suspects. If the army was not on a reprisal 
operation but was following up an intelligence lead and looking 
for a suspect or hidden weapons, any destruction was incidental 
to the searching of properties — troops also used primitive metal 
detectors on such operations.
42
 On such operations, however, 
brutality against villagers could occur as the army tried to extract 
from them intelligence on the whereabouts of hidden weapons 
caches or suspects, as happened at the village of Halhul in 1939. 
In some cases, the brutality would then extend to the vandalism 
of property as a means of gaining information. The level of 
destruction varied, the army using the excuse of weapons 
searches to justify any damage if there were complaints. Army 
engineers would also demolish houses or groups of houses.  
The destruction of property was alien behaviour for soldiers but 
they did the job with gusto, once prompted. The officer entrusted 
with checking on destruction in one village reprimanded a 
corporal who left intact a beautiful cabinet full of glasses; the 
officer then destroyed the cabinet and its contents.
43
 The British 
designated some searches as ‘punitive’, as one private recalled,  
‘Oh yes, punitive. You smashed wardrobes with plates, glass 
mirrors in and furniture, anything you could see you smashed’.
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The local District Officer told Colonel J.S.S. Gratton, then a 
subaltern with the Hampshire Regiment, that the unit’s search of 
Safad (Zefat) was a punitive raid, and so they could  
 
… knock the place about. And it’s very alien to a chap like you 
or me to go in and break the chair and kick chatty in with all 
the oil in and mixed it in with the bedclothes and break all the 
windows and everything. You don’t feel like doing it. And I 
remember the adjutant coming in and saying, “You are not 
doing your stuff. They’re perfectly intact all those houses 
you’ve just searched. This is what you’ve got to do.” And he 
picked up a pick helve and sort of burst everything. I said, 
“Right OK,” so I got hold of the soldiers and said, “this is what 
you’ve got to do,” you know. And I don’t think they liked it 
much but once they’d started on it you couldn’t stop them. And 
you’d never seen such devastation.
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In such operations, away from officers’ view, looting or the 
taking of ‘souvenirs’ was inevitable, and periodic personal 
searches of men by NCOs under officers’ orders failed to stop the 
problem of endemic petty thieving. Looting was not official policy, 
as a special order to the two battalions entrusted with re-taking 
the Old City of Jerusalem in October 1938 from the rebels 
reveals: ‘Any attempts, even the most minor, at looting, 
scrounging or souveniring by individual troops or police will be 
rigorously suppressed’.
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The largest single act of destruction came on 16 June 1936 in 
the Arab city of Jaffa when the British blew up between 220 and 
240 buildings,
47 
ostensibly to improve health and sanitation, 
cutting pathways through Jaffa’s old city with 200–300 lbs 
gelignite charges
48
 that allowed military access and control. By 
this act — headlined in  al-Difa‘ as ‘goodbye, goodbye, old Jaffa, 
the army has exploded you’ — the British made homeless up to 
6,000 Palestinians, most of whom were left destitute, having 
been told by air-dropped leaflet on the morning of 16 June to 
vacate their homes by 9 p.m. on the same day.
49
 Some families 
were left with nothing, not even a change of clothes.
50
 Such 
callous vandalism shocked the British Chief Justice in Palestine, 
Sir Michael McDonnell, who frankly condemned the action, for 
which he was dismissed; the Arabs with glee printed up 10,000 
copies of the court’s critical conclusions for public distribution.
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Unable to express their opposition to the destruction of Jaffa, the 
Palestinian press resorted to sarcasm, reporting how the 
‘operation of making the city [Jaffa] more beautiful is carried out 
through boxes of dynamite’.
52
 Particularly recalcitrant villages 
would be entirely demolished, reduced to ‘mangled masonry’, as 
happened to the village of Mi’ ar north of Acre in October 1938.
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On other occasions, the British used sea mines from the 
battleship HMS Malaya to destroy houses.
54
 Sometimes the 
charges laid were so large that neighbouring houses came down 
or flying debris hit watching bystanders. British troops even made 
Palestinians demolish their own houses, brick-by-brick.
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Following a search and cordon of the town of Safad by the 
Hampshire Regiment, the senior police officer, Sir Charles Tegart, 
noted simply and euphemistically that the soldiers’ did their work 
thoroughly’, adding that local villagers had little sympathy, 
feeling that the townsfolk of Safad now ‘know what has been 
happening to us’.
56
 Hilda Wilson, a British school teacher in 
Palestine, concluded that the reason for soldiers’ destructiveness 
was because they were ‘bored stiff’ and had no social amenities, 
compounded by the alienation that they felt serving far from 
home:
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Soldiers are traditionally careless of other people’s property … 
so what can be expected when they find themselves in a 
distant country among people who, they are told, are the 
“enemy.” I remember one occasion when the troops were 
giving me a lift from Ramallah to Ain Sinia [properly ‘ Ayn 
Sinya], and while sitting in the foremost lorry of the procession, 
waiting in Ramallah’s main street, I heard a sergeant further 
down the line instructing men on what they were to do when 
they reached their destination. They were to cordon the village, 
and then proceed to drive the people out of their houses on to 
the hillside. I shall never forget the ferocity he put into that 
word “drive.”  
 
Trapped between the hammer of rebel operations and the anvil 
of the British army, Arab peasants demanded army protection 
from the depredations of the rebels while also complaining about 
servicemen’s behaviour.
58
 In June 1936, Muslim religious leaders 
wrote to the High Commissioner detailing how police officers on 
operations ‘stamped’ on things, destroyed everything, ‘smashed 
doors, mirrors, tables, chairs wardrobes, glass, porcelain’ and 
ripped women’s clothing and bed linen. Soldiers mixed in 
margarine and oil with foodstuffs, they trampled on ‘holy books’, 
and they destroyed wooden kitchen utensils, as well as glasses, 
clocks, smoking pipes and basins.
59
 In the same month, another 
protest complained about police and soldiers hitting innocent 
people, insulting their dignity, stealing items and destroying 
furniture, goods and provisions.
60
 As one rebel recounted, 
servicemen,
61 
 
Searched houses, each one by itself, in a way that was 
sabotaging on purpose, and they looted some of the assets of 
the houses, and burnt some other houses, and destroyed 
provisions/goods. After putting flour, wheat, rice, sugar and 
others together, they added all the olive oil or petrol they could 
find. And in every search operation they destroyed a number of 
houses of the village and damaged others. They also put signs 
on other houses to destroy them in the future if there are any 
incidents near the village, even if that incident is only cutting 
telephone wires.  
 
Britain’s heavy-handed military methods combined with rebel 
demands to weaken, perhaps to shatter, Palestinian rural village 
society, creating in the process lawlessness, hunger and social 
dislocation. This was unjust collective punishment. The collective 
fines imposed were a heavy burden for poor Palestinian villagers, 
especially when the army also took away all the livestock, 
smashed up properties, imposed long curfews and police posts, 
blew up houses and detained some or all of the men folk in 
distant detention camps. Rebels also fined (or robbed) villages for 
non-compliance with the revolt, £P1000 in one case, £P10–100 
per household in another.
62
 If villagers were unable to pay 
collective fines, they paid them in produce: ‘As usual police were 
called to do the dirty work, collecting chickens, eggs and grain 
from each family and taking them to Haifa for sale’.
63  
Police activity went beyond the forced requisitioning of 
produce, as when the police went to a village after rebels had 
killed some ‘wogs’, at which point they indulged in indiscriminate 
violence against villagers, not rebels. ‘By the time we arrived of 
course they had vanished into the blue but we had orders to 
decimate the whole place which we did, all animals and grain and 
food were destroyed and the sheikh and all his hangers on beaten 
up with rifle butts. There will be quite a number of funerals their 
[sic] I should imagine’.
64
 When the police received a report that 
rebels had blocked the road with trenches and roadblocks near 
the village of Shafa ‘ Amr, they went to investigate.  ‘The local 
inhabitants protested that they had been compelled to do this 
sabotage by rebel gangs, but this excuse did not relieve them 
from a fine of £[P]700’, and they had to repair the road.
65
 For 
villagers, £P700 was a considerable sum of money to find. By 
comparison, in the late 1930s a British police officer of constable 
rank earned a basic pay of £P11 rising to £P18 for an Assistant 
Inspector a month ‘all found’, an attractive wage that drew police 
recruits to Palestine. Fines varied but could be as high as £P5,000 
and they had to be paid promptly in cash or in the form of 
produce such as animals, eggs and cereals; in the village of 
a-Tira (or Taybe/Tayyiba, the transliteration from Arabic to 
Hebrew to English is not clear), peasants responded to a fine of 
£P2,000 by picking up what they could carry and leaving.
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Villagers were in permanent debt as village mukhtars attempted 
to gather fines from their villagers who often had no livestock, no 
men folk and no food. The rationale for fines was at times 
bizarre, with the authorities fining villages for forest fires in the 
summer months, the assumption being that local peasants must 
have started these maliciously.
67
 Certain villagers were also 
required to produce bonds of up to £P100 and additional sureties 
to ensure their good behaviour. Failure to pay could result in 
imprisonment.
68  
While the British improved their methods of tracking rebels, the 
impact of military operations on villages changed little during the 
revolt. When rebels killed an RAF officer in an ambush twelve 
miles south of Haifa on 18 February 1938, badly wounding a 
British woman passenger, the British brought up a tracker dog, 
specially imported from South Africa, and the dog picked up the 
scent:
69 
 
 
The trail was expected to lead up the Wadi Mughar to the bad 
village of Igzim [in literary Arabic Ijzim], and B Company, less 
one platoon, under Major Clay was detailed as dog escort. The 
fourth platoon was given the task of rounding up 2,300 goats 
and 200 sheep for confiscation as a punishment on the 
inhabitants of the area in which the crime was committed. The 
dog quickly took up the trail and moved up the Wadi Mughar to 
Igzim, where it “marked” a house on the northern end of the 
village. It was then taken back to the coast road and put onto 
another clue, again tracking back to the same village, but to a 
house opposite the first one. When searched, however, the 
owners of both houses were absent. The whole village was then 
cordoned and searched, while reports were sent to Brigade 
Headquarters in Haifa on the result of the dog’s tracking. Later 
in the morning orders were received to demolish the two 
houses marked by the dogs …. 
  
A policeman present at Ijzim, Sydney Burr, recalled the 
brutality of the ‘search’, one that was so tough as to prompt a 
complaint about army behaviour from the Anglican mission in 
Palestine.
70
 The use of Doberman tracker dogs specially brought 
in from South Africa gave a spurious exactitude to an operational 
method that relied on villagers doing the work of the British 
army, suppressing the rebels on pain of the collective punishment 
and reprisals that would inevitably ensue if there were any rebel 
actions in the local area. Critics alleged that tracker dogs always 
picked out some suspect on parade; on another occasion, the dog 
followed a scent after a robbery to a distant village, leading the 
police to an old blind man, and then barked at him proving that 
he was the robber.
71
 Once the tracker dog had marked a 
Palestinian or a dwelling, the police invariably ‘found’ some 
bullets to confirm guilt, and the courts then took over with 
hanging the ultimate penalty for the possession of even one 
round.  
The authorities punished villages because they were the 
nearest to an incident or because they thought that a particular 
village was pro-rebel — a ‘bad’ as opposed to a ‘good’ village, 
terms that appear with regularity in the British files. In one 
operation, police dogs led troops to a house in the village of Naim 
(possibly al-Na ’ ima, Nain or Bani Na ‘ im) in which police officers 
found two Arabs  ‘of known bad character’.
72
 They told the owner 
of the house that unless he gave the police the information that 
they required, they would destroy his house. After imposing a 
collective fine of £P50 on the village mukhtars, the British 
withdrew to return several days later, whereupon they loaded up 
grain on lorries to the value of £P50 and made the villagers and 
the owner of the house carry 200 lbs of explosives up to the 
village to blow the house. The authorities then collected the 
inhabitants on the edge of the village to watch the explosion.
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The British triaged villages, destroying Muslim Arab villages while 
leaving intact neighbouring Druze villages that they viewed as 
anti-revolt. As one police officer recalled, ‘The Druze are always 
friendly and pleased to see the police and hate the Arabs like 
poison. They are a much cleaner and better looking race and are 
supposed to be descendants from the English and French 
crusaders’.
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Soldiers reported that they had little trouble from 
the Druze and Christian Arabs of Palestine, especially around the 
predominantly Christian town of Nazareth.
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 As the Hampshire 
Regimental Journal described it: ‘We might mention Mughar is a 
Christian Arab village and not in such bad odour with the 
authorities as some villages, and consequently this time was not 
searched …. The Druse are a friendly people and our relations 
with them have been most cordial’.
76
 Yet the authorities fined the 
Christians of Nazareth and destroyed houses in 1939 after a rebel 
raid, despite the local Christian clergy protesting their loyalty to 
the government. ‘The terrorists will be glad that the fi ne has 
been imposed. Notices were said to have been left in the streets 
calling the people of Nazareth traitors’ noted the Anglican 
clergy.
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 The sorting of villages was based on weak intelligence, 
as police officers’ letters home show: ‘It is very difficult to catch 
the culprits as there is absolutely no information to work on and 
you can receive no support from the population in the villages. 
You may follow the police dogs into one village and upon this 
vague clue you may smash the village and burn it down but the 
next night the wires are cut in another part of the road — and so 
it goes on’. 
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A British doctor in Hebron during the revolt, Elliot Forster, 
recalled the effect of living under sustained British military 
occupation. Accustomed to local life, Forster worked in Hebron’s 
St Luke’s Hospital and held surgeries in outlying villages. He lived 
through periods of intense military operations as the army and 
police fought local guerrillas. The rule of law collapsed as troops 
ran amok, shooting Arabs at random simply because they were in 
what was, in effect, a ‘free-fire’ combat zone. While some officers 
tried to restrain the men, local Arabs moved about Hebron and 
the surrounding countryside in fear of their lives, not from rebel 
actions but because of the violence meted out by marauding 
troops and police. ‘Anyone who sees the army nowadays runs like 
a hare — I do myself!’ wrote Forster.
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 In engagements with 
rebels, the army would shoot Arabs near the battle zone, even 
when these were old men and boys tending their flocks. Forster 
daily treated local people brought in to his hospital with gunshot 
wounds. Candid as to when he was treating a real rebel, most of 
the time he was tending gunshot wounds inflicted by 
trigger-happy British troops. He included a well-documented 
account of policemen executing in broad daylight in October 1938 
an Arab suspect travelling in a police vehicle through the 
Manshiya district of Jaffa, an outrage witnessed by non-British 
European residents, and repeated examples of troops robbing 
Arabs of money, including young children who were relieved of 
their pocket money.
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 The execution witnessed by non-British 
Europeans did lead to an investigation and charging of four police 
officers — who received minimal sentences reduced on appeal — 
but this was a unique case of servicemen being brought to 
justice.
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 In October 1938 troops even robbed the Anglican 
Archdeacon of Jerusalem, maltreating in the process the Arab boy 
whom the cleric had left to look after his affairs.
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For the soldiers, their activities in Palestine were unremarkable, 
their job being ‘to bash anybody on the head who broke the law, 
and if he didn’t want to be bashed on the head then he had to be 
shot. It may sound brutal but in fact it was a reasonably nice, 
simple objective and the soldiers understood it’.
83
 Regimental 
histories and contemporary regimental journals did little to hide 
the reprisals, destruction and collective fines, recording how 
villages were ‘beaten up’, homes burnt and men detained in 
cages ‘on orders from above’ because of rebel activity nearby.
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While euphemisms would be used — ‘the search was drastic 
enough to shake the villagers’
85
 — regimental journals would 
cheerily and sportily describe the trashing of a village, as with the 
Essex Regiment at the ‘sack’ (obvious pun intended) of Sakhnin, 
25–26 December 1937, with physical force that stopped short of 
outright torture or blatant wanton destruction — or these were 
not reported.
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The repeated complaints about the reprisals made 
to the mandate authorities by Arab petitioners and the Anglican 
clergy in Palestine, supported by first-hand evidence, met with 
denials and promises to investigate.
87  
Beyond the official policies designed to break the resolve of the 
Palestinian peasantry, there were also unofficial acts of brutality 
committed by rank-and-file servicemen. While these do not form 
part of the story of official reprisal and collective punishment, 
they contributed to the terrorising of ordinary Palestinian 
civilians, and officers operating in the field with the men 
sometimes sanctioned or simply accepted a level of casual 
brutality by their men. While the ad hoc outrages committed by 
servicemen were in some measure the soldiers’ revenge against 
attacks and a means of defeating the rebels, a willingness to 
inflict suffering on others played its part in what happened. As 
the commanding officer of the Essex Regiment noted at the end 
of 1937, punitive search operations against Arab villages were 
‘enjoyed by all ranks’.
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For instance, it was common British army practice to make 
local Arabs ride with military convoys to prevent mine attacks. 
Often, soldiers carried them or tied them to the bonnets of 
lorries, or put the hostages on small flatbeds on the front of 
trains, all to prevent mining or sniping attacks. ‘The naughty boys 
who we had in the cages in these camps’ were put in vehicles in 
front of the convoy for the ‘deterrent effect’, as one British officer 
put it.
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 The army told the Arabs that they would shoot any of 
them who tried to run away.
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 On the lorries, some soldiers would 
brake hard at the end of a journey and then casually drive over 
the Arab who had tumbled from the bonnet, killing or maiming 
him, as Arthur Lane, a Manchester Regiment private candidly 
recalled:
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… when you’d finished your duty you would come away nothing 
had happened no bombs or anything and the driver would 
switch his wheel back and to make the truck waver and the 
poor wog on the front would roll off into the deck. Well if he 
was lucky he’d get away with a broken leg but if he was 
unlucky the truck behind coming up behind would hit him. But 
nobody bothered to pick up the bits they were left. You know 
we were there we were the masters we were the bosses and 
whatever we did was right …. Well you know you don’t want 
him anymore. He’s fulfilled his job. And that’s when Bill Usher 
[the commanding officer] said that it had to stop because 
before long they’d be running out of bloody rebels to sit on the 
bonnet.  
 
British troops also left Arab wounded on the battlefield to die
92 
and maltreated Arab fighters taken in battle, so much so that the 
rebels tried to remove their wounded or dead from the field of 
battle.
93
 Lane, the soldier with the Manchester Regiment, was in a 
clash with guerrillas in which several British soldiers had died and 
he provides a graphic, disturbing account detailing what 
happened to the Arab prisoners captured after the fire-fight and 
who were taken back to the military camp and tied to a post,  
 
…  they were in a state and they were really knocked about .… 
whoever had done it when they got them on the wagons to 
bring them back to camp the lads had beat them up, set about 
them … [the interviewer asks him with what] …. Anything. 
Anything they could find. Rifle butts, bayonets, scabbard 
bayonets, fists, boots, whatever. There was one poor sod there 
he was I would imagine my age actually and I’d heard people 
say in the past that you could take your eye out and have it 
cleaned and put it back and I always believed it but it’s not so 
because this lad’s eye was hanging down on his lip, on his 
cheek. The whole eye had been knocked out and it was hanging 
down and there was blood dripping on his face. 
  
When asked why the soldiers had done this, Lane replied 
simply, ‘Same as any soldier. I don’t care whether he’s English, 
German, Japanese or what. He’s the victor he’s the boss and you 
accept the treatment that he gives you. I don’t care what you 
say. That was repeated to me later [the Japanese took Lane 
prisoner in 1942]. But it’s even today. There’s a beast in every 
man I don’t care who he is. You can say the biggest queen or 
queer that you come across but there’s a beast in him 
somewhere and in a situation like that it comes out’.
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 Lane then 
described how the men destroyed their own tents, an act that the 
commanding officer allowed so that his men could let off steam, 
but in this trashing of their own camp the soldiers left untouched 
the Arab detainees. One sergeant — described by Lane as 
deranged — led the Arab captives to the armoury to show them 
all the weapons there and spoke to them in English, which the 
Arabs did not seem to understand. He was on the point of letting 
the Arabs go free through the gates of the camp when an officer 
stopped him. Then before the army sent the Arabs to Acre jail, 
the soldiers took them
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… around the back and any lads who were doing nothing at the 
time we all gathered round and stood and formed two lines of 
men with pick axes, pick axe helves, some with bayonets, 
scabbards you know with a bayonet inside, some with rifles, 
whatever was there, tent mallets, tent pegs. And the rebels 
were sent one at a time through this what do you call it? 
Gauntlet and they were belted and bashed until they got to the 
other end. Now any that could run when they got to the other 
end went straight into the police meat wagon and they were 
sent down to Acre. Any that died they went into the other meat 
wagon and they were dumped at one of the villages on the 
outside.  
 
These excesses were soldiers’ response to rebels wounding or 
killing comrades in battles, with any prisoners, local village or 
villagers becoming the target for a revenge attack, something 
that Arabic sources also note.
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 But British accounts also detail 
soldiers bayoneting innocent Arabs
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 and Arab fighters in battle 
being machine gunned en masse by men from the Royal Ulster 
and West Kent regiments as they came out to surrender near 
Jenin. ‘At one time the Ulsters and West Kents caught about 60 of 
them [Arab guerrillas] in a valley and as they walked out with 
their arms up mowed them down with machine guns. I inspected 
them afterwards and most of them were boys between 16 and 20 
from Syria …. No news of course is given to the newspapers, so 
what you read in the papers is just enough to allay public 
uneasiness in England’.
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There is also the question of the 
methods used by Orde Wingate’s ‘Special Night Squads’ that 
mixed British servicemen with Zionist fighters and pitted them 
against the Arabs in Galilee — ‘extreme and cruel’ noted one 
colonial official, Sir Hugh Foot, a force that tortured, whipped, 
executed and abused Arabs according to another source — but is 
a subject beyond the scope of this article.
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The brutality of the Palestine police and prison service had 
some official sanction. Sir Charles Tegart, a senior police officer 
‘headhunted’ from India, authorised the establishment of torture 
centres, known euphemistically as ‘Arab Investigation Centres’, 
where suspects got the ‘third degree’ until they ‘spilled the 
beans’, a major one in a Jewish quarter of West Jerusalem was 
only closed after colonial officials such as Edward Keith-Roach 
complained to the High Commissioner.
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Interrogators used what 
we now know as the ‘waterboarding’ torture at these centres.
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Keith-Roach, to his credit, raised the issue that the ‘questionable 
practises’  carried out by CID officers on suspects were 
counter-productive both in terms of the information gathered and 
the effect on local people’s confidence in the police.
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 For the 
Anglican Archdeacon in Palestine, police abuses were the cause of 
the violence rather than a response to it.
103
 He wrote to the 
Mandate Chief Secretary in June 1936 detailing the daily 
complaints from Arabs of beatings at the hands of rampaging 
police officers, concluding with an account of a constable who was 
reprimanded for bringing in a suspect unharmed —  ‘definitely 
ordered to duff them up’ was the police order.
104 
 
The letters home of Palestine policeman Sydney Burr provide 
an explicit personal account of police brutality — ‘it is the only 
way with these people’.
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 Extra-judicial executions, torture, 
beatings and general violence were commonplace for the British 
Palestine police officers with whom Burr worked during the Arab 
revolt. Burr discusses the ‘third degree’ dished out to Arab 
suspect along with general beatings and trashing of Arab shops 
and houses in almost every letter home. Much of the brutality 
was casual and wantonly destructive, described by the police and 
soldiers in terms akin to a good, fair fight — rebel ‘hunting is still 
the great sport’ — enjoyed by all concerned.
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 Most came in the 
form of beatings in the street rather than in sinister torture 
centres, but the effects could be severe, something than can be 
overlooked in the sporting-style descriptions given in many 
memoirs: ‘it was a good fair fight with plenty of bottles and 
knives flying about. They are greatly helped by their womenfolk 
who specialise in dropping family utensils such as mangles and 
bedsteads out of the window on our unfortunate heads’.
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Thus, 
another British police officer, Douglas Duff, recalled the effects of 
a rifle-butt beating delivered by a colleague to an Arab in the 
1920s:
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… our attitude was that of Britons of the Diamond Jubilee era, 
to us all non-Europeans were “ wogs, ” and Western 
non-Britons only slightly more worthy. When one of the Nablus 
detachment produced an old cigarette tin containing the brains 
of a man whose skull he had splintered with his rifle butt …. I 
felt physically sick … the sight of that grog-blossomed face of 
the gendarme with his can half-full of human brains proudly 
brandishing his smashed rifle-butt as proof of his prowess, 
altered something inside of me; people who owned skins other 
than pink Western ones became human beings.  
Duff put it simply when talking about a Muslim Palestinian 
crowd disturbance in 1922: ‘Had our Arabic been better we might 
have sympathised with them; though I doubt it, for most of us 
were so infected by the sense of our own superiority over “lesser 
breeds” that we scarcely regarded these people as human’.
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Police officers in vehicles would try to knock down Arabs, ‘as 
running over an Arab is the same as a dog in England except we 
do not report it’.
110
 Moreover, in the early life of the Palestine 
police, many recruits were ex- ‘Black and Tans’ and ‘Auxiliaries’ 
from the Irish War of Independence (1919–21) and so came with 
experience of that brutal conflict, imbuing the force with a tough 
ethos when it came to policing the country. ‘For a time I was 
seriously troubled at the “ Black and Tan ” methods of the police, 
of which I had overwhelming evidence’, wrote the Anglican 
Archdeacon in Jerusalem to his secretary.
111
 The toughness was, 
at times, amusing, as when Burr received a handkerchief from 
home, forcing him to write back, ‘I am afraid I will not be able to 
use it here, the old Black and Tans who were the beginning of 
this force do not look upon such effeminate apparel in a kindly 
light. They think the force is going to the dogs as it is. It is 
because of the soft ways that are creeping into the police that the 
Arabs are so defiant’.
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 There was also some fascist influence 
within the police force, the authorities having to issue orders 
forbidding the practice of men giving each other the Nazi salute in 
public. On another occasion, Jews complained when a riot squad 
in Tel Aviv appeared with swastikas painted on their short riot 
shields.
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 British police officers saw their service as akin to 
serving in the French Foreign Legion, many making explicit 
reference to this — ‘a British Foreign Legion. With the faults as 
well’ — and some seem to have acted accordingly.
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The insouciance of the police was such that they 
‘smartened-up’ in jail a prisoner with rubber truncheons, not 
caring that a British clergyman who was waiting in the police 
station to report his car stolen witnessed this action.
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 This 
‘smartening-up’ might be the same instance recorded in the 
Anglican Jerusalem Mission files in which a clergyman witnessed 
the savage beating of a suspect whose teeth were already 
knocked out before he was brought in for a sustained assault by 
policemen and a man in civilian clothes who might have been a 
military intelligence officer working with the police:
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A second man came in who was in plain clothes, but whom I 
took to be one of the British Police, and I saw him put a severe 
double arm lock on the man from behind, and then beat him 
about the head and body in what I can only describe as a brutal 
and callous way. Once or twice he stopped and turned to the 
other people in the station, and in an irresponsible and gloating 
manner said “I’m so sorry” — “I’m awfully sorry.” And then 
proceeded to punch the prisoner round the station again. A 
third man came in. He was in plain clothes, and was wearing a 
soft felt hat. He was, I think, British, and may have been a 
member of the Police Force, but I thought at the time that he 
was a soldier in civilian clothes …. But this man also made a 
vicious and violent attack on the prisoner, and punched him 
about the head and body …. I am gravely disturbed at the 
possibility that one of the men who was in the station, and who 
beat up the first person who was brought in was not a member 
of the police force, but a soldier — this was the man who was 
wearing a soft felt trilby hat …. I was for two years Chaplain to 
a prison in England, and in the course of my duties not 
infrequently witnessed the methods which police and prison 
warders were compelled to use with men detained or serving 
long terms of imprisonment, and can only say what I saw on 
this occasion sickened me and filled me with the gravest 
misgivings.  
The presence of authority did little to blunt police violence, the 
Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem having to remonstrate with one 
police sergeant — ‘under the influence of drink or mentally 
disturbed’ — who was threatening a school boy travelling in the 
bishop’s car.
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 Another police office remarked to the Bishop that 
he had orders from the High Commissioner to assault Arabs.
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When clergymen discussed these issues on the telephone, the 
line went dead: ‘With regard to our telephone conversation this 
morning I feel certain that someone was listening in and cut us 
off just when you were discussing with me the serious aspects of 
the situation in Palestine’.
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On the receiving end, Palestinians made repeated complaints to 
the authorities. One young man wrote to the British detailing the 
treatment his father, ‘ Abd al-Hamid Shuman, a bank director, 
had received at the hands of the police. Arrested on 20 February 
1938 in Jerusalem, the British moved the father to Acre jail and 
then al-Mazra ‘ a detention camp (near Acre) before he ended up 
back in Acre prison hospital after what he claimed were severe 
beatings by prison guards that left him unable to walk.
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 There 
are other accounts in Arabic of suspects being tortured, of Arabs 
being blown to bits in vehicles after being forced along roads in 
which the British had placed mines, of British operatives placing 
huge terrorist bombs in Haifa, of detainees being left in open 
cages in the sun without sustenance, of men being beaten with 
wet ropes, ‘boxed’ and having their teeth smashed, and men 
having their feet burnt with oil.
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 Those who were ‘boxed’ were 
beaten until they were knocked out, ‘needles’ were used on 
suspects, dogs were set upon Arab detainees, and British and 
Jewish auxiliary forces maltreated Arabs by having them hold 
heavy stones and then beating them when they dropped them. 
Guards also used bayonets on sleep-deprived men and made 
them wear bells around their necks and then dance.
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In petitions made through the Anglican mission, Arab detainees 
in Palestine’s prisons protested at the extreme treatment meted 
out by guards. Prisoners jumped to their deaths from high 
windows to escape their captors, had their testicles tied with 
cord, were tortured with strips of wood with nails in, had wire 
tightened around their big toes, hair was torn from their faces 
and heads, special instruments were used to pull out fingernails, 
red hot skewers were used on detainees, prisoners were 
sodomised, boiling oil was used on prisoners as were intoxicants, 
there were electric shocks, water was funnelled into suspects’ 
stomachs and there were mock executions.
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 As one British 
resident in Palestine concluded, ‘after the murder [on 26 
September 1937 by Arab gunmen] of Mr [Lewis] Andrews 
[Assistant District Commissioner in Galilee] the police asked 
permission to use torture to the prisoners to extract information 
and that permission was granted from the Colonial Office. Several 
of the leading police officers in Jerusalem refused to countenance 
it. One of them has since left the country’.
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 The Arabs claimed 
that CID officers subjected suspects to such severe beatings that 
they made false confessions. Thus, ‘in order to extract from him a 
fabricated admission, and as a result of this method [severe 
inquisitorial proceedings and beating] he was compelled under 
stress and force and in order to overcome such an atrocious 
method against his body and spirit to admit that he gave to other 
terrorists one time — bomb, two bombs and a revolver’.
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Two single incidents during the Arab revolt arguably meet the 
definition of an atrocity. Neither has been widely discussed, even 
in the Arabic-language literature, but they have appeared in 
printed primary records and in television programmes.
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 The 
British army was responsible for both incidents. They occurred at 
the villages of al-Bassa, in the Acre district by the Lebanon 
border, in September 1938, and at Halhul near Hebron in May 
1939. Contemporaneous Palestinian papers such as Filastin made 
passing mention of an outrage that seems to be the one at 
al-Bassa, but there was nothing in Filastin on Halhul.
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As 
already mentioned, strict British censorship during the uprising 
ensured that Palestinian (Arabic-language) papers were closed for 
long periods of time and the Palestinian Arabic press was unable 
to make critical comment on British military activities in the 
country after 1936.
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Indeed, the Zionist press — such as the 
Palestine Post, Haaretz or Davar— had more comment on 
Britain’s repression of the revolt than the heavily censored 
Arabic-language press.  
The British killed some twenty villagers at al-Bassa, most if not 
all in cold-blood, during an operation in which villagers were also 
tortured according to Arabic sources. Up to fifteen men died in 
Halhul, mostly elderly Palestinians (the youngest victim was 
thirty-five, the oldest seventy-five) who died after being left out 
in the sun for several days in a caged enclosure with insufficient 
water. Halhul villagers also claim that soldiers shot a local man at 
a well during the same operation — in fact, it seems that soldiers 
beat the victim and then left him to drown in the well.
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At al-Bassa, British troops claimed that they had been the 
victims of roadside bomb and mine attacks — what today we 
would call ‘IEDs’. On the evening of 6 September 1938, an RUR 
armoured fifteen-cwt lorry car hit a mine near the village of 
al-Bassa, killing four RUR soldiers — Lieutenant John Anthony 
Law, Lance-Corporals J. Andrews and C. Kennedy, and Rifleman 
A. Coalter — two of whom (Andrews and Coalter) died on the 6th, 
with two dying from their wounds on the 7th (Kennedy) and the 
9th (Law).
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 The blast also seriously wounded two men. An RUR 
officer present at the time, Desmond Woods, recalled what 
happened next in an oral history interview given many years 
later:
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Now I will never forget this incident …. We were at al-Malikiyya, 
the other frontier base and word came through about 6 o’clock 
in the morning that one of our patrols had been blown up and 
Millie Law [the dead officer] had been killed. Now Gerald 
Whitfeld [Lieutenant-Colonel G.H.P. Whitfeld, the battalion 
commander] had told these mukhtars that if any of this sort of 
thing happened he would take punitive measures against the 
nearest village to the scene of the mine. Well the nearest 
village to the scene of the mine was a place called al-Bassa and 
our Company C were ordered to take part in punitive 
measures. And I will never forget arriving at al-Bassa and 
seeing the Rolls Royce armoured cars of the 11th Hussars 
peppering Bassa with machine gun fire and this went on for 
about 20 minutes and then we went in and I remembered we 
had lighted braziers and we set the houses on fire and we burnt 
the village to the ground. Now Monty was our divisional 
commander at the time, with his headquarters at Haifa, and he 
happened to be out on his balcony of his headquarters, and he 
saw a lot of smoke rising in the hills and he called one of his 
staff officers and he said “wonder what this smoke is in the hills 
there” and one of them said “I think that must be the Royal 
Ulster Rifles taking punitive measures against Bassa.” Well we 
all thought that this was going to be the end of our 
commanding officer Gerald Whitfeld, because you know 
certainly if it happened these days it would’ve been. Well 
anyway Monty had him up and he asked him all about it and 
Gerald Whitfeld explained to him. He said “Sir, I have warned 
the mukhtars in these villages that if this happened to any of 
my officers or men, I would take punitive measures against 
them and I did this and I would’ve lost control of the frontier if 
I hadn’t.” Monty said “All right but just go a wee bit easier in 
the future.”  
This is not the full story. Before or after destroying the village, 
almost certainly the latter, RUR soldiers with some attached 
Royal Engineers collected approximately fifty men from al-Bassa 
and blew some of them up in a contrived explosion under a bus. 
Harry Arrigonie, a British Palestine policeman at al-Bassa at the 
time, recalled what happened in his memoirs, with the British 
‘herding’ about twenty men from al-Bassa ‘onto a bus. Villagers 
who panicked and tried to escape were shot. The driver of the 
bus was forced to drive along the road, over a land mine buried 
by the soldiers. This second mine was much more powerful than 
the first [i.e., the rebels’ mine] and it completely destroyed the 
bus, scattering the maimed and mutilated bodies of the men on 
board everywhere. The villagers were then forced to dig a pit, 
collect the bodies, and throw them unceremoniously into it’.
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Arrigonie provides grisly photographs of the maimed bodies, 
taken by British Constable Ricke, present at the incident, and he 
claimed that the officer involved had been ‘severely 
reprimanded’.
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 Recalling the same incident, a senior British 
Palestine police office, Raymond Cafferata, wrote to his wife, ‘You 
remember reading of an Arab bus blown up on the frontier road 
just after Paddy [a slang term for the Irish] was killed. Well the 
Ulsters did it — a 42 seater full of Arabs and an RE [Royal 
Engineers] Sgt [Sergeant] blew the mine. Since that day not a 
single mine has been laid on that road’.
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The atrocity at al-Bassa prompted the Anglican Bishop of 
Jerusalem, the Rt. Rev. G.F. Graham Brown, himself a former 
military man who had been battalion adjutant of the King’s Own 
Scottish Borderers in the First World War, to visit al-Bassa and 
then call upon Montgomery, the divisional commander for 
northern Palestine. Keith-Roach, the senior colonial official, 
recounted the encounter between the bishop and the general: ‘He 
had a long interview with Montgomery and came back absolutely 
bewildered. To every question, he said, Monty had but one reply: 
“I shall shoot them.” “The man is blood mad,” the bishop moaned 
across my office table’.
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A letter in Arabic of 8 September 1938 giving the Palestinian 
side of events extends the atrocity to include premeditated 
torture. The letter dates the rebel mine explosion to 10.30 p.m. 
hours on 6 September, following which, on the morning of 7 
September, soldiers came to al-Bassa. They shot four people in 
the streets, in cafes and in the homes of the village, after which 
the soldiers searched and looted the village, before gathering and 
beating inhabitants with sticks and rifle butts. The British then 
took one hundred villagers to a nearby military base — Camp 
Number One — where the British commander selected four men 
(the letter lists their names) who were tortured in front of the 
rest of the group. The four men were undressed and made to 
kneel barefoot on cacti and thorns, specially prepared for the 
occasion. Eight soldiers then told off the four men and two per 
Arab detainee set about beating them ‘without pity’ in front of the 
group. Pieces of flesh ‘flew from their bodies’ and the victims 
fainted, after which an army doctor came and checked their 
pulses. The army then took the group of villagers to another base 
— Camp Number Two — while soldiers destroyed the village of 
al-Bassa. All of this happened on the morning of 7 September, 
with the army withdrawing at 1 p.m. on the same day.
136
 While 
this letter does not mention the villagers blown up on the bus, 
another letter of 20 September 1938 refers to the British and 
Jewish police blowing up arrested suspects in this fashion along 
the Lebanese border, the British sending back to the villages the 
mangled bits of bodies or quickly burying them.
137
 Thus, it seems 
that the army destroyed the village on the 7 September, 
returning some days later with engineers and some police officers 
to kill more villagers in one or more mine explosions under 
vehicles filled with local Arabs. 
 An 11th Hussar NCO present at al-Bassa remembered how he 
and his men had ‘flattened’  the village —  ‘blew the lot’  — 
before referring to a similar incident near Nablus where the 11th 
Hussars after suffering casualties destroyed another village.
138
 In 
the archives there are other cryptic comments from British 
officers to their destroying and burning villages but the vague 
references to what happened and the reticence of British officers 
fully to record what they were doing hampers further research. 
The Rt. Rev. W.H. Stewart, the Anglican Archdeacon of Jerusalem 
and, from 1938, Hon. Chaplain to the Palestine Police and so no 
enemy of the force, wrote of dark deeds in rural areas of 
Palestine, concluding, however, that while his evidence was 
‘absolutely trustworthy, is second hand and not such that I can 
produce’.
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 After al-Bassa, the press in Beirut noted that British 
troops ‘ont fait plusieurs expéditions punitives dans les villages de 
la région’, suggesting that it was not an isolated reprisal but one 
of a set of punishments inflicted on the Palestinians.
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The second major incident was at Halhul in May 1939. Located 
on the road between Hebron and Bethlehem, Halhul was, the 
British believed, sympathetic to the rebels. The Black Watch 
Regiment surrounded and took over the village in May 1939. 
What followed was an attempt to get villagers to hand over rifles, 
a recurring British demand during village searches, by setting up 
two wired cages. One was a ‘good’ cage in which there was plenty 
of water, food and shelter from the sun, and one was a ‘bad’ cage 
in which men were left in the open in the intense heat with 
between half and one pint of water per day. In an interview with 
a BBC ‘Timewatch’ team working on a 1991 programme on the 
Arab revolt — what it called  ‘the first intifada’  — the 
commanding officer of the Black Watch emphasised the voluntary 
nature of the action; villagers could escape the heat simply by 
handing over a rifle, after which they would be moved to the 
‘good’ cage. What he did not make clear is what the villagers 
were to do if they did not have a rifle.
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Again, a closer examination of the sources paints a less rosy 
picture of the events at Halhul. Keith-Roach, in a private letter, 
wrote that only a half pint of water was distributed, and he does 
not refer to a ‘good’ cage. Instead, after the military high 
command had given the commander of the Black Watch the 
green light, soldiers rounded up all the men of the village,
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… instructed that they be kept there [in an open cage] and he 
gave them half a pint of water per diem. I saw the original 
order. The weather was very hot for it was summer. According 
to Indian Army Medical standards, four pints of water a day is 
the minimum that a man can live upon exposed to hot weather. 
After 48 hours treatment most of the men were very ill and 
eleven old and enfeebled ones died. I was instructed that no 
civil inquest should be held. Finally, the High Commissioner, 
MacMichael, decided compensation should be paid, and my 
Assistant and I assessed the damage at the highest rate 
allowed by the law, and paid out over three thousand pounds 
to the bereft families.  
The British doctor, Forster, talks of two cages, one for the men 
and one for the women, and makes no mention of an option to 
escape the cages. They were there just for punishment. ‘We may 
yet teach Hitler something new about the conduct of 
concentration camps’ was Forster’s acerbic conclusion.
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 An Arab 
whose father died at Halhul claimed that between eleven and 
fourteen men died after two weeks in the sun with no food and 
water, one at a village well where ‘soldiers kept pushing him and 
he was killed’.
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 The same man recalled electric generators/ 
floodlights/heaters running all night to increase the detainees’ 
privations, some being so hungry that they ate dirt. A woman 
from Halhul noted that ten men died, two at the well incident, the 
British only releasing the men after the villagers produced forty 
old Turkish rifles, and that this was after eight days’ captivity. 
The same woman also recalled the night-time lights, and how the 
soldiers beat them and threw away food that the women brought 
for their captive menfolk. ‘Without guns those men will never be 
released’, one British official (local British ruler) told her.
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 Other 
Arab accounts talk of the use of ‘cages’ for three days ‘at least’ in 
military operations in other villages.
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In correspondence surrounding a Thames Television 
programme on Palestine,
147
 both Geoffrey Morton (formerly of the 
Palestine police) and Sir Thomas Scrivener (a former Assistant 
District Commissioner in Palestine) challenged the idea that 
villagers were denied water in village searches, with Morton 
questioning the ‘senile old’ peasant that Thames TV had ‘dragged 
in’ to recount his tale. It is not clear if these relate to Halhul or 
are more general comment but Thames Television’s reply is 
interesting:
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The problems of the oral tradition (confusing hearsay with 
personal experience) made us doubt it, too, and the sequence 
was cut when our Zionist adviser told us that these stories 
originated as black propaganda in Nazi Germany. One of my 
colleagues, however, undertook a personal search in the Public 
Record Office and found the original papers. As soon as this 
incident took place, Government House informed the Secretary 
of State that people had died during an arms search. The 
Secretary of State asked for full details because of the danger 
of Nazi propaganda, and payments of £2,000 were made to the 
bereaved families. 
  
The mention of compensation suggests that this could be a 
reference to the Halhul incident of May 1939. One of the 
survivors of the cages at Halhul recounted to Forster, the Hebron 
doctor, the events of May 1939:
149 
 
On my return this morning I found man had been admitted 
suffering from the effects of his internment at Halhul. He is a 
Hebron man who had the misfortune to be caught in the round 
up. He has not suffered permanently and is not seriously ill. 
The point is that he strikes me as being a quiet and reliable 
witness. He denies the lurid stories that were set forth in the 
two [Arab] petitions you showed me this morning, and says 
that apart from one man who was drowned in a well only the 
ten men we know of died from exposure. The death of this man 
in the well was bad enough, but again he says the horrible 
story told in the petition is not true. The man was suffering 
badly from thirst and in order to get a drink he told a false 
story of a rifle hidden in a well. He was let down into the well 
and drank his fill, but on being hauled up empty handed he was 
struck with the butts of rifles. He had a knife and managed to 
cut the cord on which he depended, fell back into the well and 
was drowned. My patient said the first few days were terrible, 
and the allowance of water was pitifully small. He says that he 
and others did in fact drink their own urine. During the latter 
part of his internment — he was there twelve days in all — 
things were somewhat better. As is usual with the oriental 
petitioner, these folk seem to spoil their case with exaggeration 
and falsehood. In this present case surely the unvarnished 
truth was terrible enough.  
There are other references to similar excesses in the primary 
sources. Forster mentioned a ‘worse’ atrocity at the village of 
Bayt Rima, another example of the tangential comments to other 
incidents for which there is some corroborating evidence: 
‘Apparently the military authorities declared that they had issued 
strict instructions against “frightfulness”. I don’t know if this 
makes things better or worse. Ballard [a military officer in 
Hebron] says a man at Beit [Bayt] Rima died after a beating by 
an officer.  “He’s a known sadist” is the explanation’.
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 The 
Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem wrote of ‘serious charges’ against 
soldiers in operations at Bayt Rima and Michmash, following 
which the Bishop protested to senior officers.
151
 The Anglican 
Mission in Jerusalem listed twenty-two villages and towns in 
which troops inflicted single or multiple outrages, sometimes over 
a period of many months.
152 
In 1977, a local man, Qasim 
al-Rimawi (likely a rebel and, later, ‘ Abd al Qadir al-Husayni’s 
secretary and a Jordanian cabinet minister), claimed that three 
villagers were tortured to death by troops at Bayt Rima during a 
thirteen-day search involving 2,000 troops.
153
 In November 1938, 
the army also set up fake executions for villagers in Halhul in the 
hope of getting them to hand over weapons, as a major recalled 
with ‘enormous pride’ in a conversation with Forster.
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 There is a 
reference in the regimental journal of the RUR to ‘severe 
reprisals’ following the death of soldier in a landmine attack on 
the ‘Yirka track’ (usually Yarka, a Druze village about six miles 
south-east of Acre) in February 1939.
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 ‘The Royal Ulster Rifles 
treated the Arabs very firmly indeed but by Jove it paid dividends 
but of course you can’t do those sorts of things today’, was how 
one RUR officer put it.
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After a soldier was blown up by a mine near the village of Kafr 
Yasif in February 1939, soldiers burnt down seventy houses, blew 
up forty more and, reportedly, then told nine villagers from the 
neighbouring village of Kuwaykat to run after which the soldiers 
gunned them down.
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‘I do not think the circumstances differ 
from those with which we are familiar’, noted a local Anglican 
Chaplain.
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 Under pressure from the Anglican clergy, the army 
provided some relief to the homeless villagers, the Anglican 
Chaplain in Haifa concluding:
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On the whole I cannot help wondering at the way the Arabs 
trust us and believe us and believe that in the end we will try 
and do what is right. Some of the villages which have recently 
been hardly [sic] hit seem to go as far as possible in making 
allowances. Sometimes they appear to accept the severest 
treatment as the inevitable result of acts of violence by the 
gangs, even though they themselves are not responsible. And 
they do not hold the government responsible for actions taken 
by the military authorities, though we know that the 
government can’t disclaim responsibility. The people at Kafr 
Yasif were very eager to point out that the troops who 
destroyed their houses were not English but Irish. 
  
Following the reprisal attack on Kafr Yasif, local Arabs gathered 
outside the German Consulate shouting ‘We want Hitler — We 
want Mussolini’.
160  
Arab sources make claims of police assassination squads 
abducting and killing villagers,
161
 the RAF’s use of ‘incendiary 
bombs’ on villages near Bad al-Wad west of Jerusalem resulting 
in ‘burnt’ bodies, artillery fi ring on villages at night  ‘sowing fear 
among the hearts of women and children’, women being attacked 
by soldiers, bias in favour of the Jews, and desecration of 
mosques and Korans.
162
 Arab leaders complained to Wauchope, 
the High Commissioner, that police and soldiers were ‘desecrating 
mosques, stealing personal property, destroying Korans and 
beating people up’.
163
 In retaliation, Palestinians targeted 
officials, often those who were especially brutal or pro-Zionist, 
one early victim being the British police inspector, Alan Sigrist, 
‘sentenced to death’ by local Jerusalemites, and shot along with 
his guard by two assassins in his car on 12 June 1936 outside St 
Stephen’s Gate by the Old City in Jerusalem.
164 
Notorious for his 
savage truncheon-wielding attacks on Arabs, including beating up 
the staff of the al-Difa‘ newspaper office in May 1936, Sigrist 
launched indiscriminate assaults on Arab passers-by, including a 
well-dressed District Officer who refused to pick up nails left by 
rebels hoping to puncture tyres.
165
 After Sigrist’s shooting, British 
soldiers captured and, allegedly, maltreated one of his wounded 
attackers, kicking and beating him with rifle butts in the back of a 
truck, after which he died.
166
 Another high-profile victim was 
Lewis Andrews, Assistant District Commissioner in Galilee, shot 
leaving church on 26 September 1937, accused of supporting 
Zionism; on 24 August 1938, a gunman shot dead British acting 
Assistant District Commissioner W.S.S. Moffat, ‘known for his bad 
behaviour’.
167  
There were some complaints of soldiers molesting women, 
usually the claim that they touched women’s breasts: ‘the wife of 
Asfur Shihadeh [ ‘ Asfur Shihadeh] of Bir Zeit [Bir Zayt] while on 
her way to the village spring for water was stopped by a soldier 
who proceeded to search her and feel her breasts …. On the same 
day, July 6th, 5 women of Bir Zeit [Bir Zayt] were fetching water 
from the spring to the north of the village. The troops rushed, 
searched them and shamelessly handled their breasts and bodies 
in spite of their cries and protests’.
168
 Similarly, there was an 
account of an attempted assault by troops who ‘attempted to 
attack the honour of the wife of Issa Rabah [ ‘ Isa Rabah] but she 
refused and yelled for help and consequently was rescued from 
the claws of the civilised troops by her village women 
neighbours’.
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Again,  ‘In another case the soldiers went in and 
found an unmarried girl in bed they forcibly took off her vest 
played with her breasts and tried to assault her but her shrieks 
attracted the neighbours and this was prevented’.
170 
At a search 
at Tulkarm, soldiers made women line up in front of them and 
bare their breasts to prove that they were not men.
171
 There was 
also an accusation of an assault against a girl, directed at British 
troops: ‘Sophiye Ibrahim Hamoud [Hamud] aged 12, raped by 
the army. She received a dangerous wound on her head which 
broke the skull’.
172
 Finally, there was a serious sexual assault 
allegation but this was against three Arab policemen, not British 
soldiers: ‘They beat me with their rifle butts — laid me on the 
ground. One sat on my chest and kept my mouth shut, etc., while 
another assaulted me — then the men changed places; all three 
had me in turn’.
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The issue of sexual violence is opaque; but, in general, the 
Arabs complained about British physical force, not sexual assault 
against women. It seems that sexual violence was not common 
and some of the allegations might have resulted from soldiers’ 
clumsy attempts to search frightened women. Servicemen shot 
dead stone-throwing women, but they were careful to avoid 
sexual offence — as were the Israelis after 1948 who, again, used 
inherited British repressive methods against the Palestinians.
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When it came to searching local women, female ‘wardresses’ 
attached to British units were deployed to search women villagers 
down to their ‘private parts’.
175
 On another occasion, an army 
officer complained of police  ‘mismanagement’ in failing to bring 
along a female ‘searcher’ on an operation, suggesting that female 
searchers were used in the field.
176
 There were, however, very 
few female police searchers, some Arab/Armenian, some Jewish, 
for the whole of Palestine, so outside the major towns women 
should not have been searched unless a woman searcher was 
present, impracticable in fast-moving operations. The British used 
Jewish and Armenian women as searchers — ‘no British woman 
would lower herself to do it’ — but, for example, in October 1938 
in Jerusalem they had just two Arab women for this task, one at 
the Jaffa Gate and one at the Damascus Gate.
177
 In June 1936, 
when the British wanted to search women escaping the 
destruction of old Jaffa, they sent seven women from the prison 
service in Jerusalem down to Jaffa for the job, commandeering a 
local building especially for the purpose.
178
 The British police 
claimed that the Arab rebels hid their ‘stuff’ with Palestinian 
women, the Arabs countering that hidden goods were simply 
valuables or money that they did not want stolen by 
servicemen.
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Nor did the British army act as one, regiments behaving 
differently on operations. Arab propaganda played on the fact 
that Scottish regiments were especially unpleasant. One Arab 
leaflet, written into (clumsy) English for distribution to soldiers, 
made clear the link between abuses and Scottish troops deployed 
to Palestine:
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One can never imagine inhuman deeds than bombing up the 
houses over their inhabitants of innocent ladies and children, of 
robbing passengers, then shooting them, of ruining whole 
villages and scattering their inhabitants to die of cold and 
thirst; and of obliterating the ladies of those killed persons in 
order that they might terrify the peaceful citizens. These 
savage actions are mostly committed by “ROYAL SCOTCH 
REGIMENTS,” in so many places of Palestine; and hundreds of 
photographs are kept for future generations to behold these 
actions of “ROYAL SCOTCH REGIMENTS.”  
This is corroborated by police office Burr who noted that 
Scottish regiments were the ‘worst offenders’ when it came to 
causing trouble, and ‘if an Arab sees anybody in a kilt they run a 
mile. In the trouble last year they used the bayonet on the 
slightest excuse’.
181
 The Arabs were aware of regimental 
differences, with Arab students in London in May 1939 protesting 
specifically against Black Watch soldiers following the Halhul 
outrage.
182
 Following the death of two Black Watch soldiers by 
the Jaffa Gate in Jerusalem on 5 November 1937, General 
Archibald Wavell remarked on the restraint shown by the Black 
Watch on a subsequent operation against Silwan, the village 
south of the city blamed for the attack, although he admitted that 
a suspect died ‘falling over a cliff’.
183 
Officially, after tracker dogs 
led the authorities to the village, one villager ended up hospital 
after falling off a cliff, while soldiers shot dead one man and 
wounded another. Then the authorities sealed the village 
forbidding villagers to leave without a permit, made all males 
report every evening to the police and made the village pay for a 
twenty-man police post.
184
 Yet, the private diary of a North 
Staffordshire Regiment officer tells a different tale, recording how 
Black Watch men beat to death twelve Arabs in Silwan with rifle 
butts after the death of their comrades.
185
 Why would this officer 
lie to his private diary? Palestine policemen recalled that Scottish 
regiments were especially tough when it came to dealing with the 
Arabs, and several later counterinsurgency excesses after 1945— 
at Batang Kali village in Malaya in 1948 (Scots Guards), the Aden 
‘Crater’ in 1967 (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) and the Falls 
Road in 1970 (Black Watch) — involved Scottish regiments.
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While Black Watch (Scottish) troops were involved in actions at 
Halhul and Silwan, other Scottish regiments behaved properly, as 
Forster noted concerning the change in the Hebron garrison from 
the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders to the Cameronians 
(Scottish Rifles),  ‘a far less aristocratic affair [and disbanded in 
the 1960s] but worth about six times their predecessors. Soon 
after their arrival a village patrol was ambushed and a truck 
blown up by a land mine …. The Cameronians bore no malice and 
for the rest of their stay became very popular with the people. 
Gilmour [Captain G.H. Gilmour, the officer at the ambush] 
encouraged his men to go, in properly conducted parties, to look 
at the suq and the mosque’.
187
 Moreover English county 
regiments could also act very robustly.
188
 While certain regiments 
recruited heavily from certain regions, these differences were 
fundamentally regimental and not regional, and were a function 
of the internal dynamics and leadership within different 
regiments. All of the servicemen in Palestine were regular 
volunteers, so there was continuity at the grass-roots level, 
especially as the different regiments drew recruits from broadly 
similar socio-economic backgrounds who then experienced a 
shared training and soldiering regimen. But regiments were not 
the same, some had weaker or tougher leadership cadres and 
command structures, and different traditions of soldiering, and so 
brutality was more or less likely to occur when men went on 
operations against guerrillas.
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On occasion, servicemen took the law into their own hands, not 
least as they did not appreciate that the judicial system 
supported their work in the field against the rebels as, while 
military courts with no jury did sentence to death Arabs brought 
before them, they also acquitted suspects or handed out lesser 
sentences. For instance, of eighty-two persons tried in the period 
from 20 May to 31 July 1938, the courts acquitted thirty-six, 
found one not guilty due to insanity and the average length of 
sentence was three and a half years. The British handed out 
nineteen death sentences, of which they commuted seven.
190 
One 
British military prosecutor recalled how a judge acquitted a sniper 
caught with a rifle and ammunition on a legal technicality, and 
that Jewish evidence would never be sufficient to convict an Arab: 
‘The Arab Bar appreciate the impartiality of the military 
prosecutors’.
191
 On the other hand, a policeman relating the trial 
of a Jewish rebel in the 1940s, described military justice as akin 
to ‘kangaroo courts’.
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The perceived leniency of the courts might help to explain the 
numbers of Arab suspects shot while ‘trying to escape’, a 
recurring phrase in police fi les and which policeman Burr admits 
were assassinations by colleagues who were tired of the legal 
system and so ‘shot out of hand’ suspects.
193
 Briance confessed 
to his mother that colleagues shot on the spot an arrested 
rebel.
194
 Troops also shot captives, including the Palestinian 
suspected of assassinating acting Assistant District Commissioner 
Moffat in August 1938 in his office in Jenin. The British quickly 
apprehended the assassin after the murder — he was, 
apparently, a blond hunchback and so rather visible — after 
which he was shot trying to escape, despite his disability and 
being surrounded by fit, young British soldiers.
195
 Then again, the 
Arabs nicknamed Moffat’s assassin, ‘Muhammad’, ‘gazelle’ 
because he was so swift.
196  
Arabic sources paint a harrowing picture of the judicial system. 
Abu Gharbiyah secured a press post that allowed him access to 
the workings of the military tribunals set up in 1937 and presided 
over by three military judges. His accounts of the workings of 
these military as opposed to civil courts highlight a judicial 
system in which proceedings and the passing of the death 
sentence could take less than an hour. The commanding officer of 
the Essex Regiment noted how the courts worked at ‘high 
pressure. The Arab is slow to learn’.
197
 The supreme British 
commander — at this time General Archibald Wavell — confirmed 
one sentence the same evening and the British hanged the 
convicted man the next day. The whole sequence from the start 
of the trial to execution took forty-eight hours. Abu Gharbiyah 
noted with irony how he and his comrades, ‘cheered for British 
justice!’
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 On another occasion, a family of nine from Gaza came 
before the court charged with possession of one gun. The 
judgement took fewer than two hours, with the family of nine 
standing throughout with British guards pointing weapons at 
them. The judges found six children guilty and sentenced them to 
life imprisonment, sent two children who were minors to jail for 
seven years, while they condemned the chief accused 
(presumably the father) to death.
199
 Abu Gharbiyah claimed that 
in 1938 military tribunals passed 2,000 ‘long’ sentences and 148 
death sentences, the latter not borne out by the official figures of 
those hanged. Finally, the British detained tens of thousands of 
Arabs, many of whom had no connection with the rebellion but 
were just unfortunate enough to be villagers in areas of rebel 
activity, or were sent into detention after ‘screening’ procedures 
whereby hooded Arab informers working with the British checked 
over villagers, a widespread practice in later counterinsurgency 
campaigns.  
According to official British figures, the army and police killed 
more than 2,000 Arabs in combat, while 100–112 were hanged, 
and 961 died because of ‘gang and terrorist activities’.
200
 Building 
on the British statistics, Walid Khalidi cites figures of 19,792 
casualties for the Arabs, with 5,032 dead, broken down further 
into 3,832 killed by the British and 1,200 dead because of 
‘terrorism’, and 14,760 wounded.
201 
The accounts of the fighting 
in Palestine in which  ‘unofficial’  deaths were high bear out 
Khalidi’s statistical examination. If we accept an overall figure of 
5–6,000 Arabs killed during the revolt, how many died because of 
non-British actions? Yuval Arnon-Ohanna produced figures of 
between 3,000 and 4,500 Arabs killed due to intra-Arab fighting, 
often against suspected collaborators or because of fighting 
between the Nashashibi and Husayni families, a point he 
emphasised in his critical examinations of Palestinian Arab unity 
and social cohesion during the revolt.
202
 More recent Hebrew 
work by Hillel Cohen questions ArnonOhanna’s scholarship, 
claiming that he misread Arabic sources, lowering the figure of 
Arabs killed by Arabs to 900–1,000, providing a total that is more 
sympathetic to the Arab cause as it puts less emphasis on 
intra-Arab clashes.
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What are we to make of these figures? The non-Jewish 
population of Palestine in 1939 comprised 927,133 Muslim, plus 
116,958 Christian and 12,150 ‘other’ non-Jewish, giving a grand 
total of non-Jews of 1,056,241.
204 
If we accept a total of 3,832 
Arabs killed by the British, this results in percentages of 0.36% 
non-Jewish killed. Khalidi shows that the comparable percentages 
for Britain and the US, taking the higher total figure of dead of 
5,032, would have resulted in 200,000 British and 1,000,000 
Americans killed.
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 Put this way, the figures do look more 
dramatic than they do when seen as absolute totals, and it is for 
this reason that the same statistical method was applied by 
pro-Zionist historians when detailing Israeli casualties during the 
1948–49 Arab-Israeli War, showing that they suffered more 
casualties than Britain did in the Second World War.
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 By late 1938, once the Munich crisis had passed, the British 
had deployed two full-strength divisions to Palestine. The British 
government was keen to resolve the Palestine revolt before war 
broke out with Germany and so allowed these forces to increase 
the tempo of their operations. ‘The military command in Palestine 
and the High Commissioner were able to do more or less as they 
liked’ because of the threat from Germany, recalled one officer in 
Palestine at the time.
207 
With such a large deployment, some level 
of human rights abuse was inevitable, especially as successful 
counter-insurgency demanded some degree of brutality. Did the 
reprisals and collective punishment allowed by the 1929 Military 
Law that the British used in Palestine in the 1930s constitute the 
‘severe pain or suffering’ demanded by, say, the UN definition of 
torture? This article has uncovered evidence of blatant torture — 
and recognised as such at the time — but most of what it 
describes is premeditated, systematic, officially sanctioned 
brutality in the form of collective punishments and reprisals 
directed primarily at property not people. There are fewer 
instances of unpremeditated and extreme ‘wild’ reactive 
rank-and-file brutality. These could reflect soldiers’ anger at a 
guerrilla attack — notably if rebels killed or wounded a comrade 
in an attack — and a subsequent desire for revenge. Unofficial 
torture and brutality were illegal then and now — pace the 
arguments of those such as Alan Dershowitz legitimising the use 
of torture against terrorist suspects.
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 The officially directed 
brutality was legal at the time, leaving aside the moral outrage 
that such action would now provoke. Britain’s concern to follow 
the law — modified as necessary — meant that her actions were 
usually within the law.  
While some incidents such as al-Bassa meet the dictionary 
definition of an atrocity, these outrages were not the systematic 
excesses that one would expect to see in a police state in which 
service personnel could act without ‘moral reference’. In her 
charged attack on British imperialism, Elkins described Kenya in 
the 1950s as ‘Britain’s Gulag’, not a phrase that is readily 
applicable to Palestine in the 1930s, at least not with the records 
currently available.
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 Army actions at Halhul and al-Bassa saw 
the deaths of around thirty-five people, tragic, wrong and illegal, 
but in a three-year insurgency evidence that restraint and ‘moral 
reference’ rather than unalloyed wickedness guided military 
operations. That recognised, other outrages similar to those at 
al-Bassa and Halhul undoubtedly occurred — this article has 
touched on some of them — although the numbers of dead in 
each incident were small. Cumulatively, however, these boost the 
figure of thirty-five dead to something much greater, especially if 
one considers the recurring incidence of single or several Arabs 
shot dead while running from troops, although troops were legally 
empowered to shoot ‘suspects’ who were running away following 
a verbal challenge.  
The question is partly how one measures the severity of 
excesses, partly what one looks for in the archival material. 
Wilson, the British teacher in the village of Bir Zayt, noted that 
the British soldiers whom she met daily behaved very correctly 
towards both herself and the local Palestinian community.
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 Of 
course, that Bir Zayt was a Christian Arab village in which there 
were female British teachers could also explain the troops ‘gentler 
behaviour, but when soldiers detained some local Arabs and took 
them into captivity in Ramallah prison, they did little to them 
beyond making them mend some buildings. The Arabs’ main 
complaint to Wilson was that the better-educated ones resented 
their gaolers leaving them in a cell with ordinary peasants. The 
extent of British military violence towards the suspects was to 
manhandle them through the door into the basement cell in 
which the soldiers detained them. Once released, their soldier 
gaolers gave the local men cigarettes and then a lift home.
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 The 
villagers were ‘not specially indignant, taking it rather as part of 
life’s general unpleasantness. “Turkish soldiers before 1918,” 
they said, “English soldiers now. All soldiers are alike”.’
212
 Forster, 
typically very critical of the British army, also commented on 
positive changes in British behaviour in Hebron — ‘military 
thieving has stopped’ — showing that there was no consistent 
pattern of abuse.
213 
 
Local Arab women came to see Miss Hulbert, one of Wilson’s Bir 
Zayt’s teaching colleagues, crying and complaining about the 
British detaining their menfolk for road repairs: ‘“They are 
beating them! The soldiers are beating our men!” “Beating!” 
exclaimed Miss Hulbert. “How do you mean — like this?” giving 
an energetic pantomime of two-handed whacking with a stick. 
“Oh no no!” replied the women. “Only like this” — demonstrating 
the mildest of pats and pushes; obviously no more than would be 
necessary to show the men where to go or what to do — not 
surprising when soldiers and villagers cannot speak each other’s 
language’.
214
 Whom are we to believe? Both Forster and Wilson 
are credible witnesses, both spoke some Arabic and both were 
sympathetic to the Palestinians amongst whom they lived. 
Similarly, the account above from ‘ Abd al-Hamid Shuman’s son 
regarding his father’s maltreatment at al-Mazra ‘ a detention 
camp is not supported by one of Shuman’s fellow detainees, ‘ Abd 
al-Hamid al-Sa ’ ih, who remembered calling in take-away food, 
jogging, sun-beds, educational classes, and a prison governor’s 
‘humane gesture  …  worthy of praise and I thank him for 
this’.
215 
 
British troops acted correctly and with humanity, contradicting 
the negative accounts detailed above. ‘If we wounded a terrorist 
or anything like that well I mean he was usually looked after as 
well as one of our own chaps. I don’t think there was any great 
sort of animosity’, or, ‘British soldiery were very bad at brutality; 
we used it half-heartedly or even not at all’.
216
 The Arab revolt 
raises methodological issues when faced with masses of primary 
evidence pointing in opposite directions. Soldiers’ memories of 
the conflict vary greatly, acts of great kindness sitting oddly 
alongside brutality towards vulnerable people, sometimes in the 
same soldier’s record, all evidence of the peculiar experience of 
soldiering and the later process of memory and historical record. 
Similarly, Arabic accounts are not consistent and do seem, at 
times, exaggerated. Perhaps the issue is whether one is looking 
to support or to deprecate the British army, its 
counter-insurgency methods, and imperial rule generally.  
Casual racism certainly influenced servicemen’s conduct 
towards the ‘wogs’ — ‘There is apparently only one method of 
handling the Arabs with the exception of the Bedouin, that is by 
ruthless white domination’, or ‘the Arab was a slightly half-witted 
younger brother’
217
 — but there was none of the racial hatred 
that, say, white settlers directed at the black Africans involved in 
the ‘Mau Mau’ revolt in Kenya. Moreover, soldiers disliked Jew 
and Arab in equal measure. One police officer remarked on the 
‘real’ Arabs of the desert, like ‘chalk and cheese’ compared to the 
‘craven, cowardly’ Palestinians, before going on to describe Jews 
as ‘poor soldiers’ lacking initiative and ‘guts’ who were also 
‘ill-mannered, arrogant’ and ‘subversive’.
218
 For the British troops, 
‘by and large the Arab was a clean fighter’ and they respected 
him accordingly.
219 
While servicemen commented on the dirt in 
Arab areas, they rated the rebels as worthy opponents, they saw 
the Arabs as a once-powerful culture and service in the Holy Land 
impressed them. ‘I think we British rather admire the Arabs’, was 
one officer’s far from isolated comment.
220 
Servicemen were 
disinterested when it came to the Arab-Zionist conflict in 
Palestine, excepting that the Arabs in the 1930s were the rebels 
and so were the enemy. Towards the Arabs, there was little of 
the prejudice shown after 1945, when anti-Semitism among 
servicemen was rife, perhaps because while the Arabs failed in 
their revolt, the Zionists were successful in their struggle against 
the British.  
As for the Palestinian villagers, they were so desperate to 
escape the rebels who came by night for sustenance and the 
troops who came by day to punish them that many fled their 
homes, creating an internal refugee crisis requiring official relief 
and soup kitchens, the latter organised by the Muslim waqfs.
221
 
By the end of the revolt, Palestinian villagers were referring to 
the guerrillas not as mujahidin in a holy war but as rebels 
(thuwwar).
222
 While grossly unfair, the targeting of non-
-combatants worked, the British suppressing the revolt by 1939, 
leaving them free to deploy their troops for the coming war in 
Europe. Britain directed operations against the Palestinian Muslim 
population along with the rebel bands that the army hunted 
down, when it could find them and bring them to battle. As with 
later successful counterinsurgency campaigns such as Malaya in 
the 1950s, British forces discriminated in Palestine, targeting the 
Muslim community while working with or treating leniently 
friendly groups in Palestine such as the Yishuv — the pre-1948 
Jewish community in Palestine — and, arguably, the Druzes and 
the Christian Palestinians, the latter a sensitive subject that 
deserves more examination. Support for the Yishuv during the 
revolt is beyond the remit of this article, but Britain’s recruitment 
of thousands of extra Jewish supernumerary police — 14,411 
according to one source — was one sign of her recognition of the 
relative value of the different communities in Palestine.
223
 When 
inflicting reprisals and instituting collective fines, the British 
treated the Jews softly, avoiding, for instance, house demolition 
of Jewish homes in Tiberias following the death of an Arab in a 
land mine attack.
224
 
 After 1936 in Palestine, the British established a systematic, 
systemic, officially sanctioned policy of destruction, punishment, 
reprisal and brutality that fractured and impoverished the 
Palestinian population. Most of this repression was legal to the 
letter of the military law and the emergency regulations in force 
in Palestine after 1936. The army maintained that destruction 
was not its primary aim during operations even when this was its 
operational method, suggesting that soldiers knew that such 
actions were questionable morally if not legally — servicemen 
also had orders banning photographing of demolitions.
225 
The 
authorities (re)constructed the law to give soldiers’ actions 
legality. The British had to balance what was lawful, what was 
morally right, and what worked, and these were not compatible. 
The regulations in force after 1936 made, as a pro-Arab British 
resident of Haifa wrote, ‘lawful things which otherwise would be 
unlawful’.
226
 Lawlessness was the law. Servicemen were guided 
by a legal system that meant that they could accept the 
premisses of their government that allowed for brutal actions, 
and they could do so with all the energy of good bureaucrats 
obeying orders — hence the phrase ‘banality of brutality’ in the 
title to this article, a tilt to Hannah Arendt’s study of Adolf 
Eichmann.
227 
 
Where the British army tortured and illegally executed 
Palestinians, these were the casual, uncontrolled actions of 
servicemen operating outside of the law and without explicit 
orders. That noted, while there was no discernible army chain of 
command guiding a system of extreme brutality directed at 
persons, and which broke civil law, police officers and prison staff 
might have directed torture that was systematic or even 
systemic. Looking at the Arab revolt as a whole, extreme acts of 
personal abuse were probably not systematic, and almost 
certainly not systemic. Admittedly, the British high command 
tolerated the less blatant abuses committed by its men in the 
field, but senior officers based in Haifa and Jerusalem were 
sensitive to charges of abuse, politically if not morally, and so it 
was junior officers in the field who were intimately involved in 
any excesses. The Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem put it succinctly, 
writing how outrages ‘are not officially sanctioned although they 
have not been officially regretted’.
228 
Whether there was an 
unwritten code from on high sanctioning grass-roots level gross 
abuse is unproven, and probably impossible to prove, precisely 
because those involved were unwilling to leave a written record of 
such orders. For the Anglican Bishop, those in the ‘highest 
positions of authority’ deplored the deaths of innocent civilians, 
suggesting that civil and military forces acted as a brake on 
counter-rebel operations.
229 
Britain’s forces of repression were not 
united, with the army, for instance, working with the Shai, the 
Zionist intelligence branch, handing it Arab material to translate, 
sidelining the colonial administration that opposed army 
‘methods’ that were outside ‘usual police activities’.
230 
 
Britain lost control of Palestine in the late 1930s during the 
Arab revolt. Faced with similar disturbances, other imperial 
powers responded much more harshly than the British did in 
Palestine, as even a cursory glance at other twentieth-century 
counter-insurgency campaigns shows, whether it is the Spanish 
in the Rif mountains, the Germans in Africa before the Great War 
and during the Second World War, the Japanese in China, the 
Italians in Libya, the French in Algeria, the Americans in Vietnam, 
the Portuguese in Africa or the Soviets in Afghanistan. These 
actions included systemic, boundless violence, large-scale 
massacres of civilians and POWs, forced starvation, overt racism, 
gross torture, sexual violence and rape, the removal of legal 
process, the use of chemical and biological weapons against 
civilians, ethnic cleansing, extermination camps and genocide. 
This does not excuse British abuses in Palestine but it provides 
some comparative context. Put simply, in Palestine the British 
were often brutal but they rarely committed atrocities. Indeed, by 
moderating its violence, Britain was probably more effective as an 
imperial power. Perhaps this is the best that can be said for the 
British ‘way’ in repressing the Arab insurgency in Palestine: it 
was, relatively speaking, humane and restrained — the awfulness 
was less awful — when compared to the methods used by other 
colonial and neo-colonial powers operating in similar 
circumstances, an achievement, of sorts.  
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